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Abstract  
In this paper I will demonstrate a new perspective on the Two Envelope 
Problem.  I  hope  to  clearly  show  how  the  paradox  results  from  a  problem 
pertaining to the interpretation of Bayesian probability when there is a subjective 
probability  that  is  inconsistent  with  reality.  Specifically,  the  results  are 
paradoxical because the player on average is off by a larger amount when they 
expect a larger payoff that is not an actual possibility,  than when he expects a 
smaller payoff that is not an actual possibility.
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1. Introduction
The set-up of the two envelope paradox has been discussed extensively in 
the literature (Nalebuff 1989; Broome 1995; Chalmers 2002), so I shall be brief in 
that regard. You are shown two envelopes, both containing an unknown amount 
of money, and told that one has twice as much as the other. Upon selecting one of 
the envelopes you are given the choice to switch envelopes. Should you? Set X 
equal to the amount in the envelope you currently have. There is a .5 probability 
the other envelope contains .5X and a .5 probability that it contains 2X. It seems 
to follow from Bayesian decision theory that the other envelope is worth .5(.5X)
+.5(2X), or 1.25X, making it favorable to switch. This is obviously impossible as 
we could have used the same reasoning had we chosen the other envelope. 
In 1996, Bruss presented what at first appears to be a solution to the two 
envelope paradox, and indeed it dispels this version of the paradox successfully. 
He explains that the paradox arises because X cannot be treated as a constant. If 
after being offered the choice of envelopes we reason that the other envelope has 
a .5 probability of containing .5X, we have assumed X is the value of the larger 
envelope. However, when we reason that there is a .5 probability that the other 
envelope will contain 2X, X must represent the value of the smaller envelope. 
Consequently we cannot add those terms together  as X does not represent the 
same quantity in both terms (Bruss 96). 
However, the paradox is not entirely eliminated. Suppose we had opened 
the envelope and then been offered the opportunity to switch. Once we observe 
that the envelope contains, say,  $10, that amount obviously is a constant. One 
cannot  very  well  argue  that  $10  has  two  separate  values.  Thus,  the  same 
mathematical logic used by Bruss would no longer be applicable, and the paradox 
is reestablished. So far no author has suggested a response to this complication 
that has gained significant traction.
One  popular  response  advocated  by  Christensen  and  Utts  (1992)  and 
Nickerson and Falk (2006) among others, is to reject the idea that there is a subtle 
flaw in the mathematics and instead suggest one choose the envelopes using prior 
knowledge of how much money is available. The idea is that if one can make 
assumptions  about  how  much  money  is  being  used,  one  can  calculate  the 
probability distribution  from which the amounts  are  chosen and thus make an 
educated decision on whether or not to switch envelopes. 
While this methodology would indeed be practical if one did have prior 
knowledge, this is not a legitimate solution. First, it is trivial to imagine a scenario 
in  which  one  has  no  knowledge  of  the  distribution.  Second,  and  even  more 
importantly, it evades the real issue. It is akin to attempting to explain the Monty 
Hall  problem  by  arguing  that  one  should  simply  look  at  the  host’s  facial 
expressions for clues as to which door to pick.
2. A New Perspective
To see how the paradox can be resolved in its entirety, we must examine it 
from a different perspective. Previously the literature has focused solely on the 
perspective of the player  who is offered the envelope,  not that of the offering 
party. To rectify that, let us set the game up where we are offering the money. Let 
us suppose we know that we have two envelopes, one containing $5.00 and one 
containing $10.00. We offer the player the knowledge that one envelope has twice 
as much money as the other and the opportunity to pick one. 
If the player picks the $5.00 envelope, is allowed to look inside, and then 
is given the opportunity to switch he could reason he has a .5 probability of losing 
$2.50 and a .5 probability of gaining $5.00; obviously, he reasons, it is in his best 
interest to switch. If there was a third party who knew the values of the envelopes 
but did not observe which amount the player chose, he would conclude that there 
was a .5 chance that switching would gain him $5.00 and a .5 chance that it would 
lose him $5.00. This third party would also know that both envelopes have a value 
under Bayesian probability of $7.50; clearly, there is no value in switching. We 
know that there is in fact a 0.0 probability of his losing $2.50 and a 1.0 probability 
of his gaining $5.00; therefore, we know that he should of course switch. 
The player  however,  has estimated the relative utility of his  options as 
well as he might be expected based on the probabilities he calculates from his 
subjective position and the use of Bayesian decision theory.  In this case, even 
though  his  information  was  incomplete,  his  estimation  based  on  subjective 
probability  seemed  to  be  helpful;  he  chose  the  larger  amount  of  money,  but 
because his reasoning was flawed it is only by luck on his part that he chose the 
more favorable option.
If, on the other hand, the player picks the $10.00 envelope, under the same 
conditions,  he  could  reason  he  has  a  .5  probability  of  losing  $5.00  and  a  .5 
probability of gaining $10.00. Should he not then take the other envelope? By his 
estimate,  it  is clear he should. If again there were a third party who knew the 
values of the envelopes but not which one the player chose, he would arrive at the 
same conclusion as before, that there was a .5 chance that switching would gain 
him $5.00 and a .5 chance that it would lose him $5.00. We, on the other hand, 
know that in fact his odds off losing $5.00 are 1.0 and his odds of gaining $10.00 
are 0.0. 
In this case, while he still calculates the Bayesian interpretation as well as 
can be expected  with  the  information  afforded to  him,  his  conclusion  that  he 
should switch was less advantageous than it would have been had he chosen the 
other envelope first. In essence, Bayesian decision theory was not helpful.
3. The Source of the Paradox
The  reason  the  Two Envelope  problem appears  so  problematic  is  that 
Bayesian Decision theory does not, on average, give good advice to the player 
using their subjective estimations of the probabilities of different outcomes. The 
third  party  who knew the  values  of  the  envelopes  correctly  applied  Bayesian 
decision theory to determine that there was no rational reason to switch without 
further  information.  We,  the  controllers  of  the  game,  who  had  that  further 
information, obviously knew whether or not the player should switch. 
The player, however, had to rely on assumptions that, while reasonable, 
were wrong. If the player chose the envelope with $10.00, he believed there to be 
a  .5  chance  that  the  other  envelope  contained  a  $20.00  payoff.  While  that 
assumption  cannot  be faulted  based on the information  he had, it  simply was 
wrong.  There  was  no  possibility  of  a  $20.00  payoff.  It  skewed  his  value 
expectations  higher.  Had $20.00 been an option,  had the value  of  the second 
envelope been determined by a coin toss between $5.00 and $20.00 after opening 
the first, it would have been in the player’s best interest to switch. The erroneous 
belief in the possibility of a $20.00 payoff creates the problem with subjective 
probability.
The  hypothetical  player  who  was  fortunate  enough  to  pick  the  $5.00 
envelope first used the same problematic reasoning. It was simply his good luck 
that in fact the other envelope did contain $10.00. He was mistaken about the 
possibility of losing $2.50, but the essential element is that a player who expects 
the possibility of a lower payoff that doesn’t exist is off by less than a player who 
expects the possibility of a higher payoff. This disparity is the reason the Bayesian 
interpretation is skewed too high, leading the player to believe he should switch.
Just  as  Bruss  demonstrated  why we cannot  assign  a  single  variable  to 
represent the value of the first envelope, this reasoning shows what goes wrong 
when the game itself  tells  us the value of first envelope,  forcing us to have a 
single definite value.
4. The Mathematics behind the Paradox
If this theory is correct, we would expect that it would be able to predict 
the factor of 1.25 by which one naively might believe switching would be better 
than not switching, and in fact it is able to do so. Consider two envelopes with X 
and 2X dollars.  There  is  a  .5  chance  that  one will  pick the envelope  with  X 
dollars, in which case he will believe there is a .5 chance that the other envelope 
has .5X dollars and a .5 chance that it has 2X dollars. He will thus conclude that 
the expected value of the other envelope is .5(.5X+2X), or 1.25X dollars. There is 
a .5 chance that one will pick the envelope with 2X dollars, in which case he will 
believe there is a .5 chance that the other envelope will have X dollars and a .5 
chance that it has 4X dollars. He will thus conclude that the expected value of the 
other envelope is .5(X+4X), or 2.5X dollars. 
Combining  those  values  we  obtain  .5(1.25X  +  2.5X)  or  1.875X.  This 
represents  the  value  that,  on  average,  a  player  would  attribute  to  the  other 
envelope in terms of the ratio of it to the smaller envelope. In comparison, a third 
party knowing the values of the two envelopes would regard the value of each 
envelope on average to be .5(x+2x) or 1.5X. This represents the value that, on 
average, such a third party would attribute to the other envelope in terms of the 
ratio of it to the smaller envelope. The ratio by which the first estimate is off from 
the estimation of the objective third party is, as expected, 1.875X/1.5X or 1.25 
(eliminating  the  term  X).  The  resultant  quantity,  1.25,  represents  how  much 
greater than the objective value of the other envelope a player would, on average, 
expect it to be. Clearly, now, we can see how the faulty assessment of probability 
leads precisely to the erroneous belief that the other envelope’s Bayesian value is 
1.25 times greater than the first.
5. Conclusion
Obviously  the  player  is  not  in  a  position  in  which  it  is  impossible  to 
recognize that there is no rational reason to switch. On the contrary, a perfectly 
rational player would simply recognize that his subjective probabilities provide a 
misleading account using Bayesian decision theory and would therefore ignore 
those results. As Falk and Nickerson noted in 2009, “Without seeing the value in 
one’s envelope, one should be indifferent.” Now it is clear why that indifference 
should stand when one observes the contents of an envelope.
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